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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vs-

Case No. 10205

ARDEN E. TUTTLE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellant Arden E. Tuttle appeals from his conviction of grand larceny in violation of 76-38-1 and 4, Utah
Code Annotated 1953.
· DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with the crime of grand
larceny in the District Court of Sanpete County, State of
Utah, and upon jury trial was convicted and placed on
probation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits the conviction of the appellant
in the trial court should be affirmed.
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2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement of facts
as being in accordance with the rule of law that the facts
on appeal will be reviewed in a light most favorable to the
trial court's decision.
Milton S. Harmon is a co-owner of a hardware store in
Manti, Utah (Tr. 38, 39). On the 18th day of November,
1961, the appellant purchased coal at Mr. Harmon's store
and was the last customer to leave (Tr. 39 through 41).
Mr. Harmon closed the store, left $11 in the till and at the
time of closing, there were eight or nine guns on the premises (Tr. 50). The next day Mr. Harmon had occasion to
go to the store and noticed that five of the guns that had
been in the store were missing, as was the money from the
till (Tr. 49, 50). The guns taken were a Winchester Automatic Shotgun, a Remington Pump, a .464 Magnum, a .22
Pump, and a .22 Single Shot. In addition, a telescope sight
was missing (Tr. 52), recoil pads, 30.06 shells, .22 caliber
shells and .22 caliber bird shot (Tr. 54). In addition, ten
or twelve boxes of 4/ 10 shotgun shells and boxes of Magnum shells were also missing, as well as a shotgun cleaning
kit. Not all these items were discovered to be missing on the
same day that the larceny was discovered but they were
determined to be missing after their presence was missed
a short time later. An examination of the premises disclosed that one of the windows in the store had been pried
from the outside (Tr. 57 and 93). The appellant was questioned concerning the larceny and denied any involvement.
Subsequently, on November 9, 1963, Richard Harmon,
the grandson of Milton Harmon, while hunting near the
Gunnison Reservoir, discovered four guns and the barrel
of a .22 caliber rifle (Tr. 37, 38). The guns which were
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found (Exhibit 10 through 14) matched the description of
the guns taken from the larceny of Harmon's store. The
serial numbers on the guns that could be identified matched
the serial numbers of the guns that had been taken from
the store (Tr. 59 through 61).
On or about November 29, 1962, approximately a year
after the incident and a year prior to the time the guns
were found, Calvin D. Nielson, Manti City Marshal, went
with Leonard Harmon, co-owner of the store to the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Edgar Tuttle, the appellant's father
and mother. At the time the appellant was in the Air Force
(Tr. 286) and Mr. Edgar Tuttle was in the Veterans Hospital being treated for a psychiatric disorder (Tr. 264).
According to Marshal Nielson, he requested ermission of ~
Mrs. Tuttle to search the premise , · c udin _Arden's roo .
The marshal testified that Mrs. Tuttle consented to the
search. He testified that she asked if he bad a search warrant and he replied "no." He denied saying that he could
get one (Tr. 112 to 114). A search of the room and rafters
in the room was made and nothing found. !h.ereafter, in
examining an old phonograph, they discovered some 30.06
shells, some 4/10 shotgun shells and a telescopic sight (Tr.
96) . They also found the recoil pads and some empty and
some full boxes of _.22 caliber shells, and the Magnum shells
(Tr. 98 to 103). Marshal Nielson said that he did not pry
anything open nor force any padlock, although Mr. Harmon had apparently unscrewed a tin box and a wooden box
to obtain the contents of these boxes, although their exac
contents does not appear of record. 1
Subsequently Marshal Nielson saw the appellant in
Manti on December 23, 1962, when he was in the service
1

Leonard Harmon was never called as a witness, and when this box was
opened, either then or later is not clear from the record.
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4
(Tr. 103). The appellant admitted taking the property
and the rifles and indicated that he would pay for the items
taken (Tr. 104, 105). The appellant told the marshal that
if he disclosed who was with him when the property was
taken, he would still have to shield someone (Tr. 132). The
appellant's father definitely stated in the presence of the
marshal and the county sheriff that the guns that had been
stolen could not be returned (Tr. 20). The appellant's
mother at one time turned over to Richard Harmon some
pennies and other items (Tr. 164). Sixty pennies had been
taken in the larceny. Milton Harmon testified that Mrs. ~'L '
Tuttle opened the padlocked box and tin box with a screwdriver and that she had called Mr. Harmon, subsequent to
th~earch when the items were found in the Gramophone,
and told h1m to come and get sowe more ~t 1 df ( T r. 164) .
At the time of trial, Exhibits 2 through 8, constituting
the property obtained during the search of Arden Tuttle's
room and being the items found in the Gramophone, were
marked in the presence of the jury as exhibits, and the witnesses testified concerning these exhibits, all without objection (Tr. 98 through 103, 51 through 56, 181 through 202).
An objection was made concerning the receipt of Exhibits 2
through 8 at the time they were offered. That was the first
time in the trial that it was urged that the exhibits had been
obtained by an illegal search and seizure (Tr. 211). No
pretrial motion to suppress Exhibits 2 through 8 was made
either at the time of the preliminary hearing or before the
District Court. The trial court received Exhibits 2 through
8 into evidence as well as Exhibits 10 through 15, being
the guns ( Tr. 211 ) . Subsequent to the receipt of the exhibits, the appellant Arden Tuttle testified that he purchased the exhibits from the Harmon's store (Tr. 280, 285)
and that some of the property belonged to his father (Tr.

4
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286). The appellant denied admitting guilt but did admit
the offer to pay for the guns and other items (Tr. 288) . He
explained that he offered to pay to avoid prosecution and to
avoid difficulty with the Air Force, since he claimed the
authorities had threatened him with a dishonorable discharge (Tr. 288). This latter accusation was denied by
persons present (Tr. 307).
Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned a
verdict of guilty.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE EXHIBITS 2 THROUGH 8
SINCE
(a)

THE APPELLANT MADE NO PRETRIAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE
EVIDENCE;

(b)

THE APPELLANT FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE EVIDENCE BEING
DISCLOSED TO THE JURY AND THE JURY HAD FULL VIEW OF
THE EVIDENCE WITHOUT OBJECTION PRIOR TO ITS RECEIPT
AND, AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT
TO OBJECT;

(c)

THE APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO OBJECT BY OFFERING
AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE AS TO EXHIBITS

(d)

2 THROUGH 8;

AND

THE EVIDENCE IS CONFLICTING BUT SUPPORTS A FINDING THAT
THE SEARCH LEADING TO THE DISCOVERY OF EXHIBITS 2
THROUGH

8

WAS CONDUCTED UPON PROPER CONSENT.

(a) It is submitted that the appellant is precluded from
claiming any error on the theory of an illegal search and
seizure, since no pretrial motion to suppress evidence was
made. It should be noted that the search in question was
conducted on November 29, 1962. Subsequently, on December 23rd, the appellant was confronted with the allegation that he stole the guns and other property from Harmon's store. It is clear from the record that appellant and
counsel were well aware of the search and the claims
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against its legality long before the trial. It is clear there was
adequate opportunity for a pretrial motion. None was
made. Under these circumstances, it is submitted that this
was fatal to any claim of error as to the admissibility of the
evidence. Because of the failure to make a pretrial motion,
the very evidence sought to be excluded was placed before
the jury, and referred to often, prior to the time it was
offered as evidence. This had the effect of letting the jury
hear everything that, if the claim of illegal search had been
valid, they should not have heard. In order to avoid this
have required
very problem, the great majority of courts
7
that a pretrial motion b'e made to suppress evidence claimed
to have been obtained as the result of an illegal search and
seizure and they have held that where the defendant had
knowledge prior to trial of the facts, supposedly making
out the illegal search, the failure to make a pretrial motion
precludes the claim being urged at trial or raised on appeal.
The federal courts. have generally required that a motion
to suppress be made prior to trial and have ruled that a
motion made at the time of trial is untimely. In United
States v. Sansone, 231 F.2-d. 887 (2nd Cir. 1956), a claim
of error on appeal was denied where a motiqn to suppress
was not made until the time of trial where the search had
been made five months prior. See also Zachary_ v. United
States, 275 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1960); Karp v. United
States, 277 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v.
Romero, 249 F.2d 371 (2nd Cir. 1957); United States v.
Volkell, 251 F.2d 333 (2nd Cir. 1958), cert. den. 356 U.S.
962; United States v. Nicholas, 319 F.2d 697 (2nd Cir.
1963), cert. den. 375 U.S. 933; United States v. Milano ..
vich, 303 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. den. 371 U.S.
R76: Rule41 (e), F. R. C. P.
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In Moore v. United States, 56 F.2d 794 (lOth Cir. 1932),
it was stated:
"A notebook was introduced, which had been found
in the car, for the purpose of proving ownership of the
car. It was admitted and counsel contends this was
error, because it was obtained by an illegal search and
seizure. It was not error to admit such notebook for
two reasons. Moore had knowledge of the seizure at
the time it was made and raised no objection until it
was offered in evidence. His objection therefore came
too late."
See also Butler v. United States, 153 F.2d 993 (lOth Cir.
1946).
The rna· o ·
f state courts also support this rule. In
Varon, Searches, Seizures and Immunz zes, o . 2, page 661
(1961):
"When an aggrieved person believes incriminatory
evidence has been unlawfully taken from his possession, and is intended to be used against him in a criminal prosecution, it is incumbent upon that person to
make timely objection to the .introduction of such evidence. The failure of a defendant to make such timely
motion to suppress, could well f.oreclose his right to
object to the admissibility of evidence wrongfully obtained. When such right is lost to an accused for that
reason, the prohibition persists in all future and subsequent proceedings as it has been held that a failure
to make timely motion to suppress evidence constitutes
a waiver of such right."

1~583,itis~
"Assuming that evidence obtained by an unlawful
search and seizure is inadmissible, it is necessary for
the accused who desires such evidence to be excluded
at his trial to make a timely objection to its introduc-
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tion; otherwise the right to object is lost. Where no
timely motion to suppress the evidence is made, evidence obtained by an unlawful search and seizure is
admissible not only in the proceeding in which the
constitutional guaranty is waived, but in any and all
subsequent proceedings in which it may be material.

* * *
"In most jurisdictions in which evidence obtained
by an unlawful search and seizure is ihadmissible, the
rule prevails that, as a general proposition subject to
certain limitations, an objection to evidence as obtained by an unlawful search and seizure comes too
late where it has been made the first time at the trial,
and not by a pretrial motion to return the property
or suppress the evidence. * * *',
In State v. Conner, 59 Ida. 695, 89 P.2d 197 ( 1939), the
Idaho Supreme Court expressed the requirement that a
pretrial motion to suppress was necessary bef~re illegally
obtained evidence could be challenged. The court gave the
reasons for the rule:
"* ?C· * It must be borne in mind that a proceeding to
suppress evidence, because procured in violation of a
defendant's constitutional rights, is not a part of his
trial. It is separate and apart from the trial, and the
reason for the rule is th
re the fendant has had
an opportunity to petition for the suppression q_ the
evidence before the trial he must do so or will be held
to I_J3ve 5§jved it for, to pefmit inqu1ry as to the :admissibility of the evidence,_during the trial, would certainTy result in expensive delay and might result in
confusion. In view of the purpose of the rule, requiring that the application to suppress be made before
trial, it must be and is held to require that it be made
early enough, when possible, to cause no interference
with the progress of the trial. This cannot be accom-
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plished by making the application after the jury has
been examined and accepted and before it is sworn."
See also State v. Spencer, 74 Ida.173, 258 P.2d 147 ( 1953).
The following cases have supported that position: Potman
v. State, 259 Wise. 234,4 7 N.W.2d 884 ( 1951) ; Chicago v.
Lord,3 Ill.App. 2d410, 122N.E.2d439 (1954) ;andState
v. McDaniels, 75 Mont. 61, 243 P. 810 ( 1925). Cases from
courts adopting the exclusionary rule as a result of Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S . .643 ( 1961), have also required that a pretrial motion to suppress be made. State v. Bailey, 23 Conn. J.J
Supp. 405, 184 A.2d 61; State v. Pokini, 367 P.2d 499 (''IJ
(Hawaii 1961); Vealesv.State,374P.2d 792 (Okla. Crim.
1962) ; Colorado ·Rules of Criminal Procedure, 41 (e) ;
1Hawaii Rules of Criminal Procedure, 41 (e). See also Com-_
Jmonwealth v. Lewis, 191 N.E.2d 753 (Mass. 1964).
It is submitted, therefore, that by the great weight of
authority, a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence, which
is claimed to have been obtained as a result of a unconstitutional search and seizure, should have been made. It seems
absurd to attempt to try the question of an illegal search,
which is principally a question of law for the trial court,
before the jury and then advise the jury to disregard what
they have seen and thus connected to the accused. It is submitted that the trial court correctly ruled the evidence admissible in this case since the appellant did not make a . ~- ~.•;;
1 !Jj}Jr/
timely pretrial motion to suppress.
~
(b) At the time of trial, the prosecutor had marked for ~
identification Exhibits 2 through 8 without objection from
the appellant (Tr. 98 to 100).
The testimony of City Marshal Nielson, relating to the
recovery of the items from the home of the parents of
appellant was also admitted into evidence without objec1

i

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
tion (Tr. 95, 96). Marshal Nielson was cross-examined by
the appellant's counsel concerning Exhibits 2 through 8 and
the nature of the search conducted at the home of appellant's parents (Tr. 115 to 120). The exhibits were in open
court and could be seen by the jury and had been referred
to by witnesses. It would appear that undoubtedly reference was made to these exhibits at the time of opening argument and no objection was voiced. The only objection came
at the time they were offered, although there had been substantial reference to the exhibits and the jury was clearly
apprized of the circumstances of their discovery and their
connection with the case. Under these circumstances, it is
submitted that appellant waived any basis for objection to
the evidence.
In McDonald v. United States, 307 F.2d 272 (lOth Cir.
1962), the appellant was tried and convicted of transportation in interstate commerce of stolen property. A pretrial
motion on behalf of the appellant to suppress the seized evidence was heard before the case going to the jury. The
court took the matter under advisement. Counsel for the
appellant, while the matter was under advisement, advised
the jury of the nature of the search and the fact that the
appellant had the property in his possession. On appeal the
court ruled that by bringing the evidence before the jury
without objection, the appellant could not complain of the
admission of the evidence. The court stated:
"Any question that may have existed concerning the
admission of the seized property into evidence was disposed of by the opening statement of defense counsel.
There, in effect, he admitted defendant's possession of
the property, advised the jury of the defendant's explanation of how he came into possession of it and
limited the issue in the case to the question of the de-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

fendant's knowledge the property had been stolen.
The jury was thus advised of the existence and defendant's possession of the very evidence which he sought
to have suppressed and kept from the jury's consideration. No legal reason then remained for the suppression of the evidence. Moreover, no necessity then
existed for the government to offer such property into
evidence nor could any prejudice result to the defendant by its admission" if offered., .
In United States v. Peckham, 105 Fed. Supp. 775 (D.C.
D.C.), defendant was charged with the crime of abortion.
The trial court prior to trial had granted a motion to suppress certain evidence. Subsequently, the defendant used
the suppressed evidence to refresh his memory, thus in
effect bringing the matter before the jury. On motion for
new trial, Judge Holtzoff ruled that defendant, by allowing the evidence to come before the jury, had waived the
previous benefits given by the suppression order. He stated:

"* * * The defendant waived the benefits by himself producing copies of those cards and using them
to refresh his own recollection on the witness stand."
It is submitted that since the appellant allowed the prosecution to place Exhibits 2 through 8 before the jury and
allowed witnesses to discuss the recovery of those exhibits
so that the jury was fully apprized of their connection to the
defendant, the appellant's objection came too late and any
claim of illegality has been waived.
(c) Subsequent to the testimony of Marshal Nielson and
other witnesses concerning Exhibits 2 through 8, all without objection on the basis of illegal search and seizure, appellant's counsel cross-examined concerning these exhibits
and subsequently placed the appellant on the stand, and
the appellant testified that he purchased the exhibits. It is
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submitted that on the basis of the authorities cited above,
the affirmative action by the appellant in presenting evidence to the jury constitutes a waiver of any claim of illegality on appeal.
(d) It is submitted that the trial court properly received
into evidence Exhibits 2 through 8. The appellant in his
brief confuses the evidence consisting of Exhibits 2 through
8, recovered on November 29th, 1962, with evidence recovered by a private person, Milton Harmon, on or about
December 7th (compare Tr. 95 with Tr. 165). On November 29, 1962, the day the evidence consisting of Exhibits 2 through 8 was recovered, City Marshal Nielson
in company with Leonard Harmon went to the home of
appellant's parents (Tr. 95). Appellant was away in the
Air Force and according to Marshal Nielson, they asked
Mrs. Tuttle if they could search the whole house and she
approved. She asked if they had a search warrant and
they told her no. It was asked upon cross-examination of
Marshal Nielson if he did not in fact say that they could get
one. Marshal Nielson denied making such a statement
(Tr. 112 to 115). He further denied making any threats.
Leonard Harmon was never called as a witness by either
side. Contrary to the assertions made in appellant's brief,
the situation in which the padlocked b2x was unscrewed
and items removed is not the same situation as when Exhibits 2 through 8 were recovered from the phonograph
(see Exhibits 27 ~Q 28 'Xhich are the items alle.s-edly unscre"\:ed which did not contain Exhibits 2 through 8) .
Therefore, at the time the court received into evidence
Exhibits 2 through 8, there was no testimony but the testimony of Marshal Nielson relating to the time he and
Leonard Harmon searched the premises with the consent of
appellant's mother.
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The incident involving the two boxes which were allegedly, unscrewed and the contents recovered occurred thereafter and involved only Milton Harmon, a private person
(Tr. 164 and 181). Although there is some evidence in
Marshal Nielson's testimony that Leonard Harmon un- ~ /
screwed a box, it does not appear that this was the phono- ! /
graph where the items were received but rather it appear
to be defendant's Exhibit 28 (Tr. 116). The trial court,
therefore, had no evidence contradicting Marshal Nielson
at the time Exhibits 2 through 8 were offered. The posture
of the evidence at that time clearly indicated that the search
was with the consent of the appellant's mother and Exhibits
2 through 8 were found in an old Gramophone. The search
had not been over Mrs. Tuttle's protest or a mere acquiescence in police authority. Although subsequently, appellant's mother testified that force had been used to cause her
to consent to the search, this evidence came long after the
trial court's ruling. It is apparent, therefore, that the conflict in testimony presented an issue of fact for the trial
court to rule upon. The trial court saw fit to believe Marshal
Nielson and to reject the testimony of Mrs. Tuttle. This
being so, there is ample evidence to sustain the trial court's
admission. Many basis exist for denying appellant's contentions on appeal.
First, since the appellant did not offer evidence as to any
circumstances which would support th~ lack of consent LJ~~
prior to the court's ruling, consent was demonstrated at
the time the trial court received the evidence. Therefore,
~
the receipt was proper.
.
~
Second, it appears that at the time the boxes were un- {
screwed, Mrs. Tuttle might have opened the boxes or, in .,. 1 ~ / _, \
any event, .~ Harmon, both of whom are private per- \~""' -4 ~
sons. T~tions of private persons are not within the ~ . .1'\p

rv

~~~

~~
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~

prohibitions of the exclusionary rule against receiving evidence illegally seized. Burdeau v. M cDowellJ 256 U.S. 465
( 1921) ; Search and Seizure Since M appJ 36 University of
Colorado Law Review 391, 398 ( 1964); The.Federal Law
of Search and SeizureJ F.B.I., page 7 ( 1962).
Third, even if Leonard Harmon, who accompanied
Marshal Nielson on the 29th, did unscrew a bo~
e is no
2
showing that Exhibits 2 through 8 were in th t bo
The
evidenc ·
ly to the effect that they were ound in the
mopho .
In State v. BryanJ 16 U.2d - , 395 P.2d 534 ( 1964), this
court observed that where a party consents to a search, the
search is rendered constitutionally unobjectionable. In
Smuk v. PeopleJ 72 Colo. 97, 209 P. 636 (1922), it was
recognized that it is permissible for a person who controls
the premises to consent to a search being made. In the
instant case, it was clear that Arden Tuttle, the appellant,
did not own the home where Exhibits 2 through 8 were
kept. It does not appear from the record that he was renting or was otherwise in control of any particular area, but
was away in the Air Force. A parent may consent to the
search of premises he owns which are used by his child.
United States v. Roberts, 179 F. Supp. ( 1959); United
States v. ReesJ 193 F. Supp. 849 (Md. 1961). In the latter
case the facts are almost identical to the facts in the instant
case. The home was owned by Mr. and Mrs. Rees, Sr. The
court indicated that Mr. and Mrs. Rees had the right to
authorize a search of the entire house. The premises were
in no way rented to the son. The defendant's mother and
father gave the F.B.I. consent to search their home. During the search of the defendant's room, a search was made
of a crawl space in the room. Agents found a suitcase tagged
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with the name of a third party. The defendant's father gave
permission to open the suitcase. A revolver was found linking the defendant with a murder and a, kidnapping. The
court upheld the search on the grounds that the father, having complete control over the dwelling of the child, and
having granted no specific area of exclusive control to the
child, the search was proper. This is a substantially different
situation from the case of a hotel roomer or a paid roomer
having some degree of exclusivity over the premises. The
appellant has called the court's attention to the case of
Holzhey v. United Statef, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955).
11
That case is entirely different from the instant case since ~
thejtems were found in a locked cabinet, whereas the items
he...re were found in a Gramo~. In this case there was
no evidence to indicate that the son owned the Gramophone or that the parents did not retain control or pos;ession of that Item. The search authorized in the H olzhey
case was authorized by the daughter and son-in-law, who
did not necessarily have permission to allow search of the
cabinet. When the police approached the cabinet, the
daughter and son-in-law made statements to the effect that
the cabinet did not belong to them and that they were not
authorized to allow the search. Thus, the facts are entirely
different than those in the instant case. Here, according to
Marshal Nielson, the appellant's mother authorized the
search of the whole house. The items found were found in
a Gramophone which was not locked and which apparently
did not belong to the appellant. This case, therefore, falls
within the doctrine of the Rees case approving the search
upon consent.
The appellant has also indicated that the discussion concerning a search warrant indicates that the consent was involuntary. To the contrary, according to the Marshal he

IL (
tJ . .
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advised the appellant's mother that he had no warrant and
did not tell her that he could get one. Thus, Mrs. Tuttle
was fully appraised that the officer's authority was limited,
thereby establishing limits on his own authority, which supports the inference that the search was the result of consent.
See 113 Pennsylvania Law Review 260-268 ( 1964).
In People v. Torres, 158 Cal. App. 2d 213, 322 P.2d 300
( 1958), the court noted the following facts:
"The facts bearing upon this narrow issue may be
stated briefly. At approximately 6: 00 p.m. on March
19, 1957, Officer King of the Narcotics Division of the
Los Angeles Police Department was informed by Sergeant Bitterhoff of the Robbery Division that a man
named Tony residing at 136 West 69th Street was selling narcotics. At approximately 9:45 p.m. on March
19, 1957, Officer King was standing in front of the
residence at the given address when appellant (whose
nickname was Tony) opened the door and came out.
The officers identified themselves as police officers and
stated to appellant that they had information that he
was using and dealing in narcotics. He denied the
accusatory statement. The officers then asked him
whether 'it would be all right if we'd look in the house.'
Appellant answered, 'yes, go ahead.'"
Based thereon, the court ruled the search voluntary, commenting:
"A search of a house with the express, free and
voluntary consent of a householder suspected of possessing narcotics is neither unreasonable nor unlawful. It follows that contraband found and seized in
the course of such a search may lawfully and properly
be received in evidence against the accused. People v.
Burke, 47 Cal.2d 45,301 P.2d 241; People v. Michael,
45 Cal.2d 751,290 P.2d852; People v. Hood, 149 Cal.
App.2d 836, 309 P.2d 135. It is true as pointed out in
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People v. Michael, supra, that one need not forcibly
resist an officer's assertion of authority to search, but if
he freely consents to a search, then neither the search
nor the seizure of evidence found in the course thereof
is unreasonable. As the court there stated (45 Cal.2d
at page 753, 290 P.2d at page 854), 'Whether in a
particular case an apparent consent was in fact voluntarily given or was in submission to an express or implied assertion of authority, is a question of fact to be
determined in the light of all the circumstances.' To
the same effect are People v. Lujan, 141 Cal. App.2d
143, 296 P.2d 93, and People v. Gorg, 45 Cal.2d 776,
291 P.2d 469. Since the question is one of fact primarily for the trial court's determination, the finding
of that court, SYJ?ported by substantial evidence, is
binding upon an appellate court. People v. Hood,
supra, 149 Cal. App.2d 836,838,309 P.2d 135; People
v. Allen, 142 Cal. App.2d 267, 281, 298 P.2d 714;
People v. Smith, 141 Cal. App.2d 399, 402, 296 P.2d
913."

See also People v. Burke, 47 Cal. 2d45, 301 P.2d 241 ( 1956)
where the California Supreme Court found similar facts
sufficient to show consent.
In State v. Bryan, supra, and State v. Louden, 15 U.2d
64., 387 P.2d 240, 242 ( 1963), this court observed:
"* * * Whether the evidence was lawfully obtained
and was admissible in the case was primarily for the
trial court to determine.'~
The trial court in the instant case, at the time the evidence was received, had the testimony of Marshal Nielson
which clearly evidenced that the search was with consent.
Evidence indicating lack of consent offered after the evidence was received comes too late. Even so, the trial court
was not compelled to believe Mrs. Tuttle's statement in
support of her son, since indeed she had motive for bias.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

This being so, it was apparent that the search was conducted under circumstances showing consent. Honig v.
United States, 208 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1953) ; State v.
Bryan, supra.

CONCLUSION
The facts of the instant case disclose a situation where
the appellant was clearly guilty of the crime charged. The
only question raised on appeal is that relative to search and
seizure. Although the law of search and seizure may have
been Mapped, as expressed in appellant's brief, it is apparent from the arguments made and the way the case was
tried that this was a classic on how not to raise the issue of
search and seizure. The law
en Mapped but the
appellant is a very poo arto ra
This case should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
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